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This paper offers an analysis of the arguments between fundamentalists and the claims made by Nancy 
Cartwright in The Dappled World. I start by introducing the arguments of fundamentalists through the 
work of Carl Hoefer, and go on to discuss Cartwright’s patchwork theory of laws, which is opposed to 
fundamentalism. Cartwright argues that the fundamentalists cannot claim that laws can be generalized, 
while the fundamentalists insist that they can make such claims. I will argue that this conflict between 
both sides places each side in the same epistemological boat. Once we recognize that both views are in 
the same boat, it is easier to distinguish which view is better, instead of attempting to prove that one view 
is superior to the other outright. I will argue that fundamentalism has the upper had in this debate, 
because this view allows for both theoretical and practical advances to be made in science and 
technology, while Cartwright’s view only advances the practical applications of current science. 
Cartwright’s arguments against fundamentalism will also be shown to ask too much of Hoefer and the 
fundamentalists, specifically with her F=ma example. Finally, I will show that fundamentalism can 






Philosopher Nancy Cartwright opposes the scientific view of fundamentalism in her 
book The Dappled World by arguing that fundamentalists cannot have a unified theory, 
because there will never be enough information to prove all of their laws. She contends, 
instead, that science can only ever consist of a patchwork of laws that work in specific 
circumstances. Cartwright argues that her patchwork of laws are better for solving 
practical problems, while fundamentalists research for research’s sake. In what follows, 
I use philosopher Carl Hoefer’s paper “For Fundamentalism” to explicate the 
fundamentalist’s position and argue for its theoretical and practical applications. It will 
be shown that both sides want to use their findings to better practical fields such as 
medicine and technology, but the methodology of each side differs in its approach. 
Cartwright is interested in applying existing knowledge to solve practical problems, 
while the fundamentalists continue to research theoretical problems knowing that such 
advances will lead to practical solutions. I argue that fundamentalism is more valuable 
than Cartwright’s patchwork suggests despite her arguments. In contrast, Cartwright’s 
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view only aims to produce solutions to applied scientific problems without the 
contributing to a unified or theoretical science.  
 
Cartwright’s central thesis in The Dappled World argues that laws are true in the parts 
of reality that match our interpretive models, and we cannot argue that our laws are true 
outside of those models. For philosopher Carl Hoefer, Cartwright’s claims sound 
frighteningly similar to this claim: “We have reason to think that the laws of a physical 
theory hold only in those cases where we can show that they hold.”1 This sounds less 
like a critique of how fundamentalists use projections, rather Cartwright implies that 
such projections should be heavily limited or removed from our scientific methods. 
Fundamentalists believe that the range of approximate truth of the Schrödinger equation 
goes further than the cases for which it is explicitly stated. For them, this practice of 
broadening the truth is a reasonable projective claim based on the successes of quantum 
mechanics. Putting Hoefer’s views aside, the fundamentalists do project too much, but 
they should be allowed to project, so that their findings can be applied in novel ways 
outside of the laboratory. When the fundamentalist is allowed to project outside of the 
lab, then theoretical science can influence the creation of practical solutions to real 
world problems. Quantum mechanics is a good example of this.  
 
The discovery of quantum mechanics did not provide direct solutions to practical 
problems. Rather it provided a better picture of how atoms work. This improved 
scientific picture allowed engineers and researchers to create devices and medicines to 
improve the lives of human beings for the foreseeable future. Theoretical and practical 
needs were met with the discovery of quantum physics. This is the benefit of the 
fundamentalist point of view: if one makes scientific discoveries for the sake of 
research, those results can be applied to practical problems. Cartwright undervalues the 
importance of theoretical research contributing to practical solutions for real world 
problems. The fundamentalist view focuses on theoretical advances, but those 
theoretical advances have led to countless practical solutions and innovations in 
medicine and technology. One must understand why fundamentalism is a potentially 
attractive view if it is to be shown that it has value. 
 
In the paper “For Fundamentalism” Hoefer offers his reasoning for being a 
fundamentalist. The fundamentalist argument for quantum mechanics as a possible 
fundamental theory of science was not convincing to Hoefer before he worked through 
the exact solution of Schrödinger’s equation for the hydrogen atom.2 Hoefer says that 
quantum mechanics offers a differential equation for the hydrogen atom, which states 
that mathematical laws can describe the structure of matter. When working through the 
                                                          
1 Carl Hoefer, “For Fundamentalism,” Philosophy of Science 70(5): 1401–1412, p. 1408. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/377417 
 
2 Carl Hoefer, “For Fundamentalism,” p. 1404 
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exact solution for the hydrogen atom, one discovers that in some important way, on 
Hoefer’s view, that the solution must be correct. The hydrogen atom can have a stable 
state with this equation, because “the proton and electron are bound to each other 
spatially yet never collapse as one would classically expect.”3 For Hoefer, these results 
are realistic and exact, rather than approximate and idealized as Cartwright would say. 
For Cartwright, the fundamentalists are unable to have realistic or exact results, because 
they are unable to definitively prove the generality of laws and experiments.4 Let’s take 
the model of the hydrogen atom as an example of this. 
 
The hydrogen solution comes solely from an equation and nothing else, and this, to 
Hoefer, is the most fascinating aspect of the solution.5 So when quantum mechanics is 
replaced by a more comprehensive theory of the universe, that new theory should 
include the mathematical explanation of the hydrogen atom. Hoefer can see how the 
mathematical equation might be seen as non-fundamental some day, but the description 
of hydrogen will need to be derivable from another mathematical law or laws.6 The 
mathematical equation for the hydrogen solution appears to be, and will continue to be, 
fact on Hoefer’s view. This example will be the beginning of the usefulness that 
fundamentalism offers. The hydrogen solution is highly theoretical, but in having a 
better theoretical picture of subatomic particles allows engineers to create new 
technology based on those theoretical findings. For instance, the better understanding 
that quantum mechanics gives of the atom opened the door for engineers to build 
transistors, which were used to make smaller computers, and eventually developed into 
cell phones and other technologies that we use everyday. When scientists have a better 
knowledge of atoms they can design better technologies based on the theoretical 
information. The fundamentalist is fulfilling the practical needs of society while 
exploring the theoretical curiosity of science. This is the first step to understanding 
fundamentalism and its value. 
 
Hoefer’s example gives us a good point of reference for the views of fundamentalists. 
He believes that the smallest particles can be explained mathematically and accurately, 
and thus that the world and its phenomena can be described through these descriptions 
as well. These findings will most likely endure more scientific revolutions and will 
continue to affect the way we think about the universe and the objects we create in it. 
The model of the atom has been refined over several centuries, but the 20th and 21st 
centuries have vastly expanded our knowledge at the sub-atomic level. This 
                                                          
3 Carl Hoefer, “For Fundamentalism,” p. 1404 
 
4 Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World p. 34 
 
5 Carl Hoefer, “For Fundamentalism,” p. 1404 
 
6 Carl Hoefer, “For Fundamentalism,” p. 1404 
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advancement in our knowledge has brought about fields such as nanotechnology, which 
does not operate at the sub-atomic level but is on the micro scale. Advancements in 
fields such as nanotechnology have provided innovative solutions to medical 
techniques and treatments. These practical solutions would not have been possible 
without the theoretical advancements made by theories like QM. Scientists are also 
very confident that atoms and their subatomic particles exist due to the massive 
amounts of evidence discovered over the past century. Any credible future scientific 
revolution would, most likely, include the existence of atomic particles, rather than 
ridding them altogether.7 Yet Cartwright objects to the claims that a unified science 
wants to make, and challenges widely accepted equations like F=ma. 
 
Cartwright’s main argument against fundamentalism concerns an example about the 
equation F=ma and its descriptive power of falling objects. F=ma says that if we know 
the mass of an object and multiply it by its acceleration, then we can know the force of 
the object and, in some cases, its trajectory. Cartwright views the equation as having to 
predict where the rock will fall, in addition to what the force of the rock will be. This 
view of the equation is a misconstrued one, and her example falters because she argues 
that F=ma should describe more than it does. The example she gives states that we can 
predict where a rock will fall when it is dropped from a balcony using F=ma, but there 
is no accurate prediction for dropping a dollar bill in the same situation, because wind 
and other forces affects its course. When a rock is dropped from a balcony, forces such 
as wind affect the location of where the rock will land also, but the effect of the wind is 
oftentimes negligible and the prediction is still considered accurate. The 
fundamentalists would argue that F=ma gives an accurate description of both scenarios, 
but that Cartwright demands too much from the equation.  
 
Cartwright wants to describe the F=ma example as a ceteris paribus law. Ceteris 
paribus states that a law or experiment only works under a particular set of conditions. 
Cartwright would like to claim that F=ma should be a ceteris paribus law, or that it 
will only work when there are no other forces like wind. This seems problematic 
considering what has already been said. The only conditions F=ma needs are an object 
and a force to exert on the object, and both the dollar bill and the rock fulfill these 
criterion. Cartwright wants to say that the equation should be even more particular than 
this, and that forces such as the wind should be taken into account as well.8 But 
accounting for the wind would be describing the example she gives with something 
other than F=ma. The guidelines she uses to mark out her argument are unclear. 
 
                                                          
7 Carl Hoefer, “For Fundamentalism,” p. 1403 
 
8 Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World p. 27 
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No guidelines have been given for what laws such as F=ma are responsible for 
describing. Clearly the same forces are affecting both the dollar bill and the rock, but 
these forces affect each object differently. Forces that are not included in F=ma affect 
both objects, such as wind, but these effects are not apparent on the final location of the 
rock. F=ma plays the same role in both the rock and the dollar bill example, because 
the equation only describes the downward force of each object and not the other forces 
affecting the experiment. The dollar is still vulnerable to the forces of gravity and wind, 
but we do not need a model that describes the wind in order to understand that F=ma is 
describing the falling motion of the dollar bill, and not necessarily where it lands.  
 
With this example Cartwright argues that fundamentalism is not able to model such 
situations, and is therefore inadequate as a theory. For her, our theories and laws only 
work within particular conditions. She does not hold the view that equations like F=ma 
can be applied everywhere at all times. Cartwright’s argues that science cannot have a 
fundamental concept of itself, and if we attempt to hold this position we are misleading 
ourselves. The example of the dollar bill, for Cartwright, is an example of an inaccurate 
picture of our reality, and if scientists want to create an accurate image of the universe, 
they should recognize the fault of our assumptions about our theories and laws. 
Cartwright offers a patchwork theory of laws as a replacement for fundamentalism, and 
she believes that her theory recognizes that our laws and experiments only work in 
particular circumstances. These particular circumstances are the only place our laws 
will work; they almost always fail in the observable ‘real’ world. 
 
Cartwright’s view is not true for the fundamental laws she argues against. F=ma is an 
applicable description of an object, even if other forces alter its course, because the 
equation is describing the behavior of the object falling and not the other forces 
affecting the experiment. Many contemporary experiments are expected to predict and 
describe results within the particular parameters of the experiment, but F=ma is not 
responsible for the description of the wind affecting the falling dollar bill. Rather F=ma 
tells us that the dollar will fall to the ground, but not necessarily where. The point is 
clearer if a heavy storm surrounds the balcony while both objects are dropped. The 
equation F=ma still applies to the rock, even if the storm blows it to another point on 
the ground, similar to the dollar bill example. F=ma only needs to tell us that the rock 
will fall. No description of the wind is necessary for the equation to hold true.  
Cartwright’s claim is centered on the issue of projection in contemporary science.  
 
Cartwright’s development of ceteris paribus laws leads to her claim about projections 
in contemporary science. On her view, our laws are not universal, especially our most 
fundamental laws about what are taken to be fundamental particles. The belief that 
experiments work outside of the laboratory is not a projection Cartwright is willing to 
accept, even if such phenomena exist. On Cartwright’s view, scientists create and 
produce the results that they want within the laboratory, and should not be allowed to 
make any projections from their results about the world, because there is no proof these 
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experiments work outside of the laboratory.9 Hoefer gives a defense for the 
fundamentalists against Cartwright’s arguments. 
 
Hoefer offers a curious defense in response to Cartwright’s critiques of fundamentalism 
using her F=ma argument. As we have seen, the F=ma example shows that the second 
law of physics is not universal because we cannot explain or model the outside forces 
into our account of the dollar bill dropping from a balcony. For Hoefer and other 
fundamentalists this example does not falsify Newton’s second law. Fundamentalists 
believe, on faith, that if one back-calculates the F=ma example and takes into account 
gravity and the forces affecting the dollar, then the forces calculated really did exist.10 
In addition, these forces “are in principal derivable from other fundamental physical 
laws.”11 But Cartwright is unwilling to accept the faith of the fundamentalists, so she 
argues that the dollar being dropped does not fall under F=ma’s ceteris paribus law, 
because particular circumstances are not satisfied. Cartwright’s objection is reasonable. 
Why would we take things on faith in science? We would not, and this is a weakness in 
Hoefer’s argument, but it’s also possible that Cartwright and Hoefer do not fully 
understand each other. Hoefer does not seem to think we need a model of the wind in 
order to understand that F=ma applies to the example, and we should not need one if 
we understand what F=ma describes. Hoefer’s use of the word faith does not help his 
case. Instead, he should argue for the limitations of the descriptive power of F=ma, 
rather than discussing back-calculation, something he cannot fully defend. Cartwright 
implies that the equation should give a full explanation of the situation. For our 
purposes we need to understand that F=ma does describe falling objects, but does not 
give an entire description of what will happen when the object falls, nor does it need to.  
 
Cartwright does not demand that a fundamental theory give a model for the dollar 
dropping, but she does demand that if one has faith in fundamental laws they should be 
able to describe how a model could be constructed. Fundamental laws are unable to 
fulfill Cartwright’s demands, but they do have a set of interpretive models that 
“demonstrably obey the relevant laws.”12 Cartwright is unsatisfied with the amount of 
evidence that fundamentalists give for their theories, while Hoefer and the 
fundamentalists are content with their findings. Both sides spread themselves too thin 
with their arguments and attempt to argue separate points when they are actually 
leaning towards a similar conclusion. Practical applications are necessary for both 
sides, but Cartwright wants to focus on practicality exclusively, while the 
                                                          
9 Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World p. 28 
 
10 Carl Hoefer, “For Fundamentalism,” p. 1406 
 
11 Carl Hoefer, “For Fundamentalism,” p. 1406 
 
12 Carl Hoefer, “For Fundamentalism,” p. 1407 
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fundamentalist gives room for both theoretical and practical science. But Cartwright 
also wants the fundamentalists to limit their projective power, despite the advances that 
have been made with these projections. 
 
Cartwright’s central thesis in The Dappled World argues that laws are true in the parts 
of reality that match our interpretive models, and we cannot argue that our laws are true 
outside of those models. For Hoefer, Cartwright’s claims sound frighteningly similar to 
this claim: “We have reason to think that the laws of a physical theory hold only in 
those cases where we can show that they hold.”13 This sounds less like a critique of 
how fundamentalists use projections, rather Cartwright implies that such projections 
should be heavily limited or removed from our scientific methods. Fundamentalists 
believe that the range of approximate truth of the Schrödinger equation goes further 
than the cases for which it is explicitly stated. For them, this practice of broadening the 
truth is a reasonable projective claim based on the successes of quantum mechanics. 
Perhaps the fundamentalists do project too much, but they should be allowed to project, 
so that their findings can be applied in novel ways outside of the laboratory. When the 
fundamentalist is allowed to project outside of the lab, then theoretical science can 
influence the creation of practical machines. The fundamentalist’s ability to do 
theoretical research and apply findings to practical machines gives fundamentalism the 
upper hand over Cartwright’s views.  
 
Hoefer suggests that Cartwright’s arguments saddle the fundamentalist with 
unreasonable reductionist demands. These reductionist demands do not need to be 
discussed fully; rather the limitations that Cartwright and the fundamentalists have 
placed on themselves should be recognized. Cartwright wants to say that the 
fundamentalists cannot definitively say that hydrogen atoms in the real world look the 
same as the ones in the laboratory. The fundamentalists believe that they can project 
such claims from their findings. Neither is in a position to prove their findings 
absolutely correct, so we must decide which view provides the better results for science 
and society. This attitude seems to discourage new mathematical descriptions of the 
universe from turning into actual experiments that can yield evidence for the claims the 
mathematics make. Two of Cartwright’s main claims intersect at this point: her view 
that science should focus on practicality and her desire to limit the fundamentalist’s 
ability to project.  
 
In limiting the fundamentalist’s use of projection, Cartwright lowers the value of the 
theoretical work being done by fundamentalists. She advocates a scientific position 
that favors the use of science as a conduit through which practical machines can be 
built to aid society. The parameters and uses of Cartwright’s theories are well known 
to her. There is no question in her mind that her system works, but they limit the 
possibility of our theories applying and assisting society outside of the laboratory. 
                                                          
13 Carl Hoefer, “For Fundamentalism,” p. 1408 
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The hydrogen solution gives us an exact and realistic description of the hydrogen 
atom. This theoretical discovery and others like it have allowed scientists to take steps 
forward in theoretical physics and the practical applications of their findings, despite 
the fundamentalist’s inability to prove that hydrogen atoms are homogenous 
throughout the universe.  
 
Cartwright is unable to definitively prove that a patchwork theory of laws is more 
valuable than working towards a unified theory of laws. One can see that the 
fundamentalist view is valuable despite Cartwright’s arguments against it, in its 
theoretical and practical advances. Cartwright heavily advocates the creation and 
research of practical solutions to be made for the benefit of mankind. This is a great 
cause to advocate for, but it sounds like Cartwright’s views would be building new 
machines out of older ones, because of her lack of interest with theoretical science. One 
must ask if we would move forward, and if so at what rate, to create better machines for 
the benefit of mankind if we did not do theoretical research. Quantum mechanics 
allowed scientists to develop new technologies for the benefit of mankind at a rapid 
pace, but theoretical advancements in the field of physics needed to happen before such 
benefits could be had. Fundamentalism is the better view because of this reason. 
Scientists are capable of doing research in theoretical fields that will eventually 
contribute to our engineers in their laboratories. There is no telling how the findings at 
CERN will benefit the engineer working to better medical technologies, but based on 
the history of science such theoretical advances will almost certainly improve our 
practical applications of our scientific knowledge.  
 
